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Abstract: in Book VIII of his Confessions, Saint Augustine offers a detailed 
description of one of the most famous cases of weakness of will in the history 
of philosophy. Augustine characterizes his experience as a monstrous 
situation in which he both wills and does not will moral growth, but he is at 
odds to explain this phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas’s action 
theory offers important resources for explaining Augustine’s monstrosity. On 
Aquinas’s schema, human acts are composed of various operations of intellect 
and will, and thus are subject to disintegration. In order to capture the gap in 
human action between making choices to pursue particular goals and 
translating those choices into behavior, Aquinas distinguishes between two 
operations of will that he calls choice and use. I apply his distinction between 
choice and use to Augustine’s case, arguing that Augustine’s moral weakness 
is a result of will’s failure to use its choices. The central thesis of this paper is 
that Augustine’s monstrosity is a bona fide case of weakness of will that is 
best explained as a failure in use at the level of will. 
 
I. Augustine’s Monstrosity 
In Book VIII of his Confessions, Saint Augustine offers a 
detailed description of one of the most famous cases of weakness of 
will in the history of philosophy.1 He recounts how he had spent his 
youth rejecting the Catholic faith of his mother, and indulging in the 
pleasures of the body, especially sexual pleasures. Yet he reaches a 
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point in life when he ardently desires to be morally upright and to 
return to Christianity. However, in virtue of the bad habits he had 
developed throughout his youth, he found it exceedingly difficult to 
change, even though he now believed with certainty the truths of 
Christianity, and even though he felt an extremely strong desire to live 
in accordance with the moral ideals he now so fervently held.2 
Anyone reading this compelling account cannot help but feel the 
genuine sense of mental torture and frustration Augustine 
experiences. He describes the experience as “madness,”3 an “agony of 
hesitation,”4 a “monstrous situation,”5 a “morbid condition,” in which 
the mind commands itself to will and fails to obey its own command.6 
Speaking to his friend Alypius about the situation, he exclaims: “What 
is wrong with us? ... Uneducated people are rising up and capturing 
heaven ... and we with our high culture without any heart—see where 
we roll in the mud of flesh and blood.”7 Augustine’s frustration stems 
not only from being unable to act in accordance with his best 
judgments and most fervent desires, but also from his inability to 
provide an adequate explanation of the experience. “What causes this 
monstrosity and why does this happen?” he exclaims.8 
Augustine’s experience of weakness of will indicates one very 
common way that human actions can fail or fall apart. His account is 
so compelling, in part, because his experience of weakness of will is so 
familiar, at least to those who take morality seriously. For many 
people, moral growth is an important goal, but it is also an arduous 
struggle, requiring that we alter well-established patterns of behavior 
and bad habits in order to live more consistently in accord with our 
moral ideals. The struggle is so maddening because despite knowing 
what we ought to do, and despite making genuine choices to do it, like 
Augustine, we are often weak, and at the moment of action, we often 
fail to translate those choices into behavior. 
In this paper, I argue that Aquinas’s action theory, and, in 
particular, his conceptual distinction between choice and use, is crucial 
in explaining cases of weakness of will such as Augustine’s 
monstrosity. On Aquinas’s schema, human acts are composed of 
various operations of intellect and will, and thus are subject to 
disintegration. In order to capture the gap in human action between 
making choices to pursue particular goals and translating those 
choices into behavior, Aquinas distinguishes between two operations of 
will that he calls choice and use. I apply this distinction between choice 
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and use to Augustine’s case, arguing that Augustine’s moral weakness 
is a result of will’s failure to use its choices. Augustine characterizes 
his experience of weakness as a case in which he both wills and does 
not will moral growth, but he is at odds to explain this phenomenon. 
The central thesis of this paper is that Augustine’s monstrosity is a 
bona fide case of weakness of will that is best explained as a failure in 
use at the level of will.9 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in order to frame my 
arguments, I begin with a brief discussion of contemporary distinctions 
between recklessness, compulsion, and weakness. In the second 
section, I discuss Aquinas’s action theory, paying special attention to 
his distinction between choice and use. In the third section, I then 
apply Aquinas’s distinction between choice and use to explain 
Augustine’s monstrosity. I conclude with some very general remarks 
about the usefulness and application of this approach in contemporary 
discussions of moral agency. 
 
II. Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion 
Every evening after dinner, Rachel fixes herself a big bowl of ice 
cream. She is overweight, has recently had a knee replacement, and 
has been told by her doctor that she must lose weight. She knows 
eating ice cream every night is bad for her, and she really wants to 
lose weight and take some pressure off those knees, but every night 
she eats the ice cream anyway. There are at least three possible 
explanations of this fairly common experience, each of which issues a 
very different moral assessment of the situation: Rachel is either 
reckless, compelled, or weak-willed.10 
Rachel is reckless if her failure to act is a result of culpable 
ignorance, of either failing to know relevant information that is readily 
available to her, (e.g., that ice cream is high in fat, that a diet high in 
fat can lead to being overweight, that being overweight is unhealthy 
and strains the knee joints, etc.), or failing to consider what she 
knows. The reckless agent makes a poor judgment about how to act, 
in this case to eat the ice cream, that she would not have made if she 
had only paid adequate attention to the reasons available to her. Thus 
she makes a culpable error in reasoning.11 
In contrast, compulsion occurs when an agent makes the 
correct judgment about how to act but cannot act on her judgment 
because she is not in control of her behavior. Compulsion refers to 
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internal physiological or psychological constraints that make certain of 
the agent’s desires irresistible, or quite literally out of her control. The 
most common cases of compulsion are cases of addiction, where, for 
example, an agent no longer has the capacity to resist one more 
cigarette or one more hit of heroin. So Rachel is compelled only if her 
desire for ice cream is literally irresistible. The compelled agent may 
be culpable in some instances for initial reckless behavior that led to 
the addiction that now compels.12 Yet even if she is responsible for 
developing the habit, once addiction takes hold the agent no longer 
has the capacity to resist the relevant desires. She cannot control her 
actions despite her better judgment. 
A third possible explanation of Rachel’s failure every night to 
resist eating ice cream is weakness of will. A weak-willed action is an 
action that an agent performs against her better judgment. Unlike the 
reckless agent, the weak agent judges correctly about how she ought 
to act, and so does not make an error in reasoning. Unlike the 
compelled agent, the weak agent has the capacity for self-control to 
act on her better judgments. The weak-willed agent fails to act in 
accordance with her better judgment not because her desires are 
irresistible, but because she is weak and gives into temptation. She 
makes the correct judgment, and she has the capacity for self-control, 
but this capacity is weak and unstable, and so she often fails to 
exercise it.  
Weakness of will is supposed to pick out those cases in between 
recklessness and compulsion in which an agent makes a culpable error 
in willing. Yet there is a long philosophical tradition of skepticism about 
whether weakness of will, so described, is even possible, which has 
given rise to two competing lines of thought.13 Some philosophers take 
a Socratic line, arguing that it is not possible for an agent to act 
intentionally against her better judgment, such that weakness of will is 
really just a species of recklessness.14 Weakness of will is not a failure 
of will at all but a failure in reasoning, typically characterized by an 
error in evaluating, or ranking, particular goods, in which an agent 
judges to be best at this moment what she usually judges, or would 
otherwise judge, to be worse had she considered reasons available to 
her.15 Others contend that weakness of will collapses into  
compulsion.16 On this line of thought, the weak may very well make a 
clear-headed and correct judgment about how they ought to act. They 
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fail to go through with it because their desires to do otherwise are 
irresistible, and thus compulsive. 
Skeptics contend that what we call a weak-willed action must 
either be a case of an agent making skewed judgments at a particular 
moment about what’s good for her, and thus being reckless, or of an 
agent not genuinely authorizing her behavior, and thus being 
compelled. Yet defenders of weakness of will note that eliminating this 
third possibility makes it difficult to explain the very common 
experience of the struggle to break bad habits or to become a morally 
better person.17 If weakness of will collapses into recklessness, then 
agents who claim to be acting contrary to their best judgments are 
culpable but disingenuous, i.e., “they do not really judge as best what 
they claim to judge as best.”18 Yet if weakness of will collapses into 
compulsion, then people are sincere in their proclamations about 
knowing what they ought to do, but they aren’t free to do it, and so 
aren’t culpable for failing to act. 
The worry is that by eliminating weakness of will as a viable 
category of human experience, we do away with any meaningful 
notion of self-control. Most of us striving to develop better eating 
habits are not compelled to eat ice cream in the same way a heroin 
addict is compelled to take another hit. Nor do we always fail to act 
because of an error in judgment. Standing at the freezer door, I may 
not need any further information, and I may well be judging that I 
really ought not eat the ice cream. I may be considering fully all the 
relevant information, and I may have the capacity to exercise control 
over my desire for the ice cream, but I am weak and so fail in many 
instances to do so. 
The debate over the possibility of weakness of will is extremely 
nuanced and complex, and it is not my aim in this paper either to 
explore these nuances further or to offer a philosophically rigorous 
defense of weakness of will. For the purposes of this paper, I assume 
that weakness of will is possible, which seems a reasonable 
assumption given that it has the support of both ordinary experience 
and philosophical argument. I use these distinctions among 
recklessness, weakness, and compulsion to frame the rest of the 
discussion, beginning with Aquinas’s views about the nature and 
source of human action. 
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III. Aquinas’s Action Theory 
For Aquinas, human action is a process characterized by means-
end reasoning, whereby an agent identifies an end, some object or 
state of affairs that she apprehends as good for her, deliberates about 
possible means for realizing that end, and then engages in the 
behavior that she decides is likely to secure that end.19 The powers of 
intellect and will are what enable an agent to perform an intentional 
action. Aquinas understands intellect and will, not as wholly 
autonomous, discreet faculties that act independently of one another, 
but rather as powers an agent has that in various ways depend on one 
another, and work together to enable an agent to perform an 
intentional action.20 Intellect is a cognitive power that apprehends 
particular objects and actions as good, and thus provides the 
information required for action. Will is an appetite for the good that 
provides the motivation or impetus for action. 
Aquinas takes great pains to differentiate the particular 
operations of intellect and will that together make possible a complete 
human action, in a way that enables us to explain a range of human 
behavior. What we see at the macroscopic level is an agent setting her 
sights on some desired object, or state of affairs, that she aims to 
pursue, deliberating about, and then deciding how to pursue it, and 
then pursing it. Aquinas provides a very fine-grained account of what 
happens at the microscopic level by delineating the specific operations 
of intellect and will required to facilitate this process. In what follows, I 
first sketch briefly Aquinas’s views about the nature of intellect and will 
and their relationship to one another. I then turn to consider in greater 
detail the specific operations of intellect and will that compose a 
complete human action, paying special attention to choice and use. 
As an appetitive power, will is an inclination for the good in 
general. Will is a kind of hunger, craving, or bent for goodness, though 
not for any particular good.21 Indeed, on Aquinas’s schema, will cannot 
make its own determinations about the goodness of particular 
objects.22 This is the job of intellect. Intellect is a cognitive power that 
apprehends particular objects as good, and then presents these 
objects to will. Once intellect presents something to will as good, then 
will wills it, since will just is an appetite for the good.23 Yet the 
relationship between intellect and will is more nuanced than it may 
first appear. Will is not merely intellect’s pawn, following wherever 
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intellect leads, but rather the two depend on and move one another, 
though in very different ways. 
Aquinas distinguishes between two ways any power of the soul 
can move: first, “as to the exercise or use of the act,” and second, “as 
to the determination of the act.”24 X moves Y to the exercise of its act 
when X prompts or incites Y to act rather than not act (i.e., to “do its 
thing,” so to speak). X moves Y to the determination of its act when X 
directs Y to do this or that particular action. Aquinas gives the example 
of sight to illustrate the difference. The power of sight “sometimes 
sees actually and sometimes sees not; and sometimes it sees white, 
and sometimes black.”25 The distinction here is between (a) acting 
rather than not acting (e.g., seeing as opposed to not seeing), and (b) 
doing something in particular (e.g., seeing white at this moment and 
black at another moment). This distinction is crucial for explaining the 
relationship between intellect and will. 
Will is responsible for moving all the powers of the soul (except 
the nutritive powers) in the first way, namely to the exercise of their 
respective operations.26 Since each power of the soul is naturally 
directed toward some good that is proper to it (e.g., “sight is directed 
to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of 
truth”), and since will is an inclination or craving for goodness, then 
will moves the powers of the soul by prompting them to act.27 Will 
moves intellect, then, as an efficient cause by turning it on, or inciting 
it to think.28 As Aquinas puts it: “I think because I want to.”29 Yet since 
will cannot make determinations about the goodness of particular 
objects, will is not capable of directing action. That is, will is not 
capable of providing direction about what, in particular, to do. This is 
intellect’s job. Intellect moves will in the second way, by providing 
direction about the particular object or ends toward which will 
inclines.30 
Though will depends on intellect for its object, and though will 
wills whatever intellect presents to it as good, Aquinas contends that 
intellect does not coerce will to incline toward any particular good.31 
Indeed, there are at least two ways in which will can indirectly 
influence intellect’s apprehension of a particular object as good or not 
good. The reason for this is that in most cases what we apprehend as 
good is not so convincing as to leave no room for dissent. As Aquinas 
notes: “Something apprehended to be good and appropriate in any 
and every circumstance that could be thought of would, to be sure, 
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compel us to will it.”32 However, most objects are not apprehended as 
good from every point of view, but as good under one description and 
repellent under another description, such as “when what is good for 
health is not good for pleasure.”33 Thus, will can indirectly influence 
the direction of our thought by distracting intellect from thinking about 
one thing in order to consider something else.34 For example, Rachel 
may be single-minded about not eating ice cream in order to lose 
weight until she sees a commercial for Breyer’s Rich and Creamy, 
which directs her to think of the pleasure ice cream brings, rather than 
the health risks eating too much of it imposes. Moreover, since will is 
responsible for turning intellect on, will can also direct intellect to stop 
thinking altogether. If intellect is not thinking, then it is not supplying 
will with any object to will. In this way will can indirectly turn itself off. 
The picture that emerges from this brief sketch is one of 
interdependence between intellect and will. Will and intellect move 
each other and work together to enable an agent to perform an 
intentional action. Intellect provides the specific content or information 
required to pursue a particular course of action, and will provides the 
motivation or impetus required for action. We can see this more 
clearly by considering Aquinas’s distinctions among the specific 
operations of intellect and will that compose a complete human action, 
including, though not limited to: intention, counsel, choice, the act of 
command, and use. Perhaps the best way to do so is to return to 
Rachel and the ice cream. 
Rachel knows that she needs to lose weight, and she has 
wanted to do so for a long time. Her desire to do so, however, has 
never been more than a fleeting wish—until now. Motivated by the 
severity of her knee surgery, Rachel decides that she will change her 
ways, and she begins thinking seriously about how she might meet her 
goal to lose fifty pounds. On Aquinas’s schema, Rachel has 
apprehended that losing weight is good for her and has now formed an 
intention to lose weight, which has prompted her to deliberate about 
specific courses of action she might take to achieve this goal. To 
intend a particular end involves more than simply wanting that end. 
Aquinas uses the example of health to illustrate the difference between 
wanting and intending. He states: “For when we speak of intending to 
have health, we mean not only that we will to have it, but that we will 
to reach it by means of something else.”35 Seeing that health is good, I 
may desire to have it, but I don’t yet intend to be healthy until I desire 
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to secure good health in a way that prompts further reflection about 
how I might do so. 
Intention then is an act of will that presupposes an act of 
intellect.36 In intention, intellect has presented a particular end to will, 
in this case losing fifty pounds, prompting will to hunger for that end in 
a way that, in turn, nudges intellect to inquire into specific ways the 
agent might attain that end, in this case, specific ways by which 
Rachel might actually lose fifty pounds. In forming a genuine intention, 
Rachel now wills to reach the end through some means, though she 
has not yet chosen a particular means. So Rachel begins to consider 
some options: she could start exercising by walking for an hour every 
morning; she could eat nothing but green beans; she could avoid the 
frozen food aisle when at the store and not buy the ice cream (if its 
not in the house, she won’t eat it); or Rachel could make no changes 
at all in her behavior. In an act of intellect that Aquinas calls counsel, 
intellect deliberates about these and other possibilities and settles on 
what is to be done.37 
Let’s say Rachel fixes on starting small by walking past the 
frozen food aisle next time she’s at the grocery store. At the 
microscopic level, intellect has judged “walking past the frozen food 
aisle” as the way to secure the end. Intellect then presents to will 
“walking past the frozen food aisle” as what is to be done, which 
prompts a further act of will that Aquinas calls choice. In choice, will 
elects the particular course of action intellect has presented as the 
means, which in this case is “walking past the frozen food aisle.”38 
Choice is substantially an act of will, though like intention, choice also 
involves intellect.39 Choice results from intellect providing information 
about precisely what is to be done and will beginning to provide the 
impetus for doing it by indicating “yes, this is what should be done.” 
Intention and choice are distinguished, then, because in forming an 
intention the agent wills the end through some means generally, 
whereas in making a choice the agent wills the end through a 
particular means.40 
Choice indicates a much greater level of commitment than 
intention does on the part of the agent toward attaining the desired 
end, for once an agent has chosen, she is at the brink of action. Once 
a bona fide choice has been made (e.g., once Rachel has chosen to 
walk past the frozen food aisle), all that remains is to do it. Thus far 
intellect and will have worked together to determine what must be 
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done, and have psychologically positioned the agent for action. There 
is nothing left to do but act. And yet Aquinas’s keen insight is that the 
act does not simply flow from choice but requires further work on the 
part of intellect and will. On Aquinas’s schema, once will has chosen, 
intellect must then command the executive power(s) to act.41 An 
executive power is whatever body part or other faculty the agent must 
use in order to execute the desired action.42 For example, the 
executive powers that perform the act of walking past the frozen food 
aisle are Rachel’s legs. So will’s choosing then prompts intellect to 
issue an order, “walk past the frozen food aisle,” which in turn 
prompts will to obey intellect’s command in an operation Aquinas calls 
use.43 In use, will obeys intellect’s command by triggering the 
executive powers, in this case Rachel’s legs, to strive toward 
possessing the end in reality, thereby enabling the agent to perform 
the behavior she thinks will secure the end. 
Like choice, use involves both intellect and will. Use 
presupposes that through the act of command, intellect directs will to 
use the limbs of the body in order to implement the chosen means. 
However, Aquinas defines use as substantially an act of will that 
“signifies the application of a thing to an operation; and hence the 
operation to which we apply a thing is called its use.”44 His examples 
are that we use a horse to ride or a stick to strike, and we apply the 
term ‘use’ to the riding and the striking. To use an object is to be in 
the process of doing something with that object.45 For example, I am 
using a stick when I am beating the stick against an old rug in order to 
shake the dust out. Similarly, will uses the limbs of the body, in this 
case Rachel’s legs, when Rachel is actually implementing intellect’s 
command to act by moving her legs so as to walk past the frozen food 
aisle. 
Aquinas individuates choice and use by pointing to two distinct 
relations between will and the thing willed, where the thing willed is 
the composite end-through-(a particular) means. In this case, the 
thing willed is “losing fifty pounds by walking past the frozen food aisle 
when at the store.”46 In the first relation, the agent becomes prepared 
or positioned to pursue the end-through-means, and in the second 
relation, the agent actually strives to pursue the end-through-means.47 
The first relation occurs in choice where, by choosing a determinate 
means, will wills the means in such as way as to prepare the agent to 
execute the act and pursue the end. Intellect has settled on precisely 
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what is to be done in order to secure the end, and will wills to take this 
particular course of action. So, once will chooses “walk past the frozen 
food aisle,” Rachel is ready to act. Yet for Aquinas, choice is 
insufficient to propel the agent into action even after intellect 
commands the act; action requires a further act of will. Thus, the 
second relation of will to the end-through-means occurs in use, 
whereby will triggers the relevant body parts into motion and sustains 
them in motion as the agent strives to pursue the end. So after will 
chooses “walk past the frozen food aisle,” and after intellect issues the 
order for the legs to move in the appropriate way, will must trigger 
and sustain the requisite movement of the legs in order to enable 
Rachel to successfully avoid the frozen food aisle. In choice, the agent 
is poised to pursue the end-through-means and is at the brink of 
action. In use, the agent begins to perform the action by employing 
the chosen means and continues to do so until the end is possessed. 
Let’s say that Rachel makes a genuine choice to walk past the 
frozen food aisle when next at the grocery store, and yet when the 
opportunity arises she is weak and caves, heading straight for the 
Klondike Bars. Aquinas would say that if Rachel has indeed made a 
bona fide choice but fails to use her choice, this failure in use indicates 
a failure on the part of intellect to command the act wholeheartedly.48 
It is of course possible for use to fail as a result of some external 
impediment interfering with the movement of the limbs of the body. 
Yet, when it appears that use is failing at the level of will, that is, when 
it appears that will is failing to will something that intellect is 
commanding it to will, this is because intellect “is moved by opposite 
motives to command or not to command; with the result that it 
fluctuates between the two,” and thus commands imperfectly.49 As 
Eleonore Stump puts it, in such cases intellect is “being moved by 
opposed desires to represent the thing in question as both good 
(under one description) and not good (under a different description), 
so that the intellect is double-minded.”50 Since will depends on intellect 
to direct it to the ends toward which it inclines, if intellect is divided or 
double-minded about the objects it presents to will (in this case about 
whether to command the act), then will is likewise divided about what 
to will. So for Aquinas, if Rachel has made a bona fide choice, and, 
barring any external impediments to action, she fails to use her choice, 
the fault rests ultimately with intellect. Will can fail to use its choices, 
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but only to the extent that intellect falters in issuing the command for 
will to do so. 
It is true that will can play a role in weakening or dividing 
intellect by, for example, directing intellect to think about the pleasure 
ice cream brings rather than the health risks eating too much of it 
imposes. Perhaps as Rachel approaches the frozen food section of the 
store she sees a display advertising ice cream on sale, which prompts 
her to think about how tasty those Klondike bars really are. Yet, since 
will can never make its own determinations about the goodness of 
particular objects or actions (and thus cannot determine on its own 
which objects or actions to pursue), any instance of will distracting 
intellect presupposes that intellect has presented such an action on the 
part of the will to will as good. Indeed, on Aquinas’s schema, the 
remedy for this kind of failure is for intellect to become strong enough 
to issue a perfect command to act, for “when the mind commands 
itself perfectly to will, then already it wills.”51 Thus, Aquinas is likely to 
explain Rachel’s so-called weakness of will as ultimately a species of 
recklessness, namely as a failure of intellect at the requisite time, to 
issue a unified and single command to will about what to will.52 
Yet, Augustine’s description of his struggle to live in accord with 
his moral ideals suggests a compelling case against this line of 
reasoning. Augustine is explicit that his failure is not a failure of 
intellect but of will. Indeed, as we shall see, he writes of the 
experience in terms of a unified intellect and a divided will. He believes 
with absolute certainty the truths of Christianity, he knows precisely 
what he must do in order to live a morally upright life, and his mind is 
commanding, wholeheartedly, that he do it. In Augustine’s case, 
intellect presents to will a unified and strong command to act, a 
command that will repeatedly fails to obey. This is what makes the 
experience so monstrous. Augustine contends that he fails to act 
because his will is divided, half-hearted, partially engaged and thus 
weak, but that this weakness of will is not due to any weakness on the 
part of intellect. Indeed, Augustine’s experience suggests that will can 
be shaped by preferences formed from prior bad habits so as to fail to 
follow where intellect leads, even when intellect leads wholeheartedly. 
Yet, Augustine is at odds to explain how this happens.  
In the following section, I argue that Augustine’s struggle to live 
a morally upright life is best explained as a bona fide case of weakness 
of will (as opposed to either recklessness or compulsion), that is best 
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characterized as a failure in use at the level of will. My use of 
Aquinas’s notion of use departs from Aquinas’s own views about the 
nature of intellect and will, and their relationship to one another in 
facilitating a human action. It is doubtful that Aquinas would grant will 
the kind of autonomy that my argument presupposes, and it is, 
therefore, unlikely that he would apply his schema for human action in 
the way I propose. Nonetheless, when applied in the alternative way I 
suggest, Aquinas’s fine-grained conceptual distinctions between choice 
and use enable us to make sense of Augustine’s claim that even 
though intellect is fully engaged, will is only partially engaged, both 
willing and not willing the desired end. 
 
IV. Taming Augustine’s Monstrosity: Use as 
applied to Augustine 
At the opening of Book VIII, Augustine is explicit that his 
struggle to return to the Catholic faith of his mother, and to live in 
accordance with the moral ideals he now so ardently held dear, is no 
longer an intellectual struggle. He states: “All doubt had been taken 
from me....My desire was not to be more certain of you but to be more 
stable in you.”53 A bit further on he notes, “I no longer had my usual 
excuse to explain why I did not yet despise the world and serve you, 
namely, that my perception of the truth was uncertain. By now I was 
indeed quite sure about it.”54 Augustine’s failure to act is not a case of 
recklessness in which intellect is double-minded or divided, presenting 
a mixed message to will about what goods to will. Rather, for 
Augustine the failure is a failure of will that produces a “morbid 
condition of the mind which, when it is lifted up by the truth, does not 
unreservedly rise to it.”55 
Yet, one might plausibly argue that Augustine’s experience is 
more akin to compulsion than to weakness. Indeed, Augustine often 
uses language and imagery that suggest he was not in control of his 
behavior. Describing his struggle to convert he states: “I was sure it 
was better for me to render myself up to your love than to surrender 
to my own cupidity. But while the former course was pleasant to think 
about and had my notional assent, the latter was more pleasant and 
overcame me.”56 He explains his condition: “I was...bound not by an 
iron imposed by anyone else but by the iron of my own choice....” and 
that by “servitude to passion, habit is formed, and habit to which there 
is no resistance becomes necessity.”57 Admittedly, the description of 
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habits to which there is no resistance becoming necessity, desires that 
overcome, and the imagery of being bound by iron, suggest that at 
this point Augustine is enslaved by concupiscence such that he does 
not have the capacity to resist these desires. Yet in my view, the real 
frustration for Augustine, the reason why this is such a monstrous 
experience, is that he does have the capacity to change. 
Augustine characterizes his frustration in terms of his mind 
knowing and wanting to change, and yet this very same mind failing to 
do what it was commanding itself to do. He states: 
 
The mind commands the body and is instantly obeyed. The mind 
commands itself and meets resistance....The mind orders the 
mind to will. The recipient of the order is itself, yet it does not 
perform it. What causes this monstrosity and why does this 
happen? Mind...would not give the command if it did not will, 
yet it does not perform what it commands. The willing is not 
wholehearted, so the command is not wholehearted. The 
strength of the command lies in the strength of the will, and the 
degree to which the command is not performed lies in the 
degree to which the will is not engaged.58 
 
Augustine is extremely perplexed because, though his body so easily 
obeys the commands of the mind, mind somehow can’t obey what it 
commands of itself. Herein lies Augustine’s monstrosity: he genuinely 
wills to live a morally upright life, for his mind would not command 
itself to do this if it did not already will it. However, he also thinks that 
willing the act is the “one necessary condition” for doing the act, and 
yet he fails to act. So though in one sense he wills the act, in another 
sense, he must not.59 He fails to complete the desired action at this 
point in his life because “the degree to which the command is not 
performed lies in the degree to which the will is not engaged,” and his 
will is only partially engaged. 
Augustine describes will’s partial engagement in terms of two 
wills battling it out, in particular, an old will shaped by prior bad habits 
and a new will inclining toward new moral ideals and commitments.60 
Augustine does not mean that there are literally two wills, but rather a 
single faculty that is divided. The one necessary condition for action is 
to will the act, but only if the willing is wholehearted and unqualified 
and not divided and “half-wounded.”61 So, the problem is that will is 
divided; the fact that Augustine has the capacity to overcome his 
divided will, but fails to exercise this capacity, is what makes his a 
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case of weakness rather than compulsion. Compulsion, as in cases of 
severe addiction, can be monstrous in its own right. It is the agony of 
quite literally not being in control of your behavior. The truly 
compelled person’s will is enslaved by certain desires such that even if 
she judges she ought to behave otherwise, and even if she wishes in 
some sense to do so, her will just automatically inclines and moves 
toward certain goods in a way that she can no longer control. Indeed, 
this is why cases of severe addiction often require intervention, in 
which loved ones literally force the addict (in some cases through 
brute physical means) into rehabilitation facilities. Drug addicts often 
undergo physical detoxification, as well as therapy, in order to alter 
both their physiology and psychology and regain their capacity for self-
control. 
Augustine’s monstrosity is not the agony of someone who is 
literally not capable of acting otherwise. Rather, his is the agony of 
someone in the midst of the struggle for moral growth and who has 
the capacity to change. Augustine has made some progress toward 
change, but he does not easily or smoothly become the person he so 
ardently desires to become, because his will to do so remains divided 
and thus weak. He states: 
 
Inwardly I said to myself: Let it be now, let it be now. And by 
this phrase I was already moving towards a decision; I had 
almost taken it, and then I did not do so. Yet, I did not relapse 
into my original condition, but stood my ground very close to 
the point of deciding and recovered my breath. Once more I 
made the attempt and came only a little short of my goal; only 
a little short of it—yet I did not touch it or hold onto it.62 
 
Here we see Augustine in struggle trying to secure the desired end and 
drawing nearer to doing so, but remaining weak and so failing time 
and again to achieve total success. Yet, with each failed attempt he 
does not fall completely back into his bad habits and old ways, which 
indicates that he is exercising some capacity for self-control. His 
capacity for self-control is strong enough to prevent him from 
completely relapsing, yet not strong enough to trigger and sustain a 
wholehearted and genuine moral change. 
This is a classic case of weakness. Augustine’s experience is not 
reckless, for Augustine has achieved certitude, and intellect is issuing 
a unified and single command to act. Nor is it a case of compulsion, for 
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Augustine is capable of resisting old desires, even though he feels their 
pull. The pull of old desires does not cause him to revert entirely to old 
patterns of behavior, in the way that they would do were his will 
compelled by these desires. Rather the tug of old desires makes him 
weak, and thus makes his struggle to act arduous and slow. Yet 
Augustine remains utterly bewildered by what causes this weakness, 
especially since intellect is wholeheartedly engaged. The impediment 
to action seems to be his continual love of temporal goods including 
the pleasures of the body. Yet, what is it that the impediment 
interferes with? How can we make sense of will being engaged enough 
to prevent Augustine from relapsing entirely into his old ways and yet 
not engaged enough to facilitate complete conversion so as to make 
him fall just short of his goal? 
Here I return to my claim that Aquinas’s action theory, and in 
particular his distinction between choice and use, enables us to unpack 
and understand Augustine’s monstrosity. Augustine describes his 
weakness of will experience as one where his mind commands itself to 
will something, and yet, it is unable to perform the act that it 
commands of itself. Augustine is willing an act of will, namely, that his 
will should have a change in disposition away from loving and desiring 
the goods of the body toward loving and desiring the goods of God and 
Christianity. So in Aquinas’s terms, the executive power that needs to 
execute the act is will itself. Augustine states that mind commands 
“that it should will, and would not give the command if it did not 
will.”63 In Aquinas’s terms, we can liken mind’s command that it should 
will to intellect’s command to act, where intellect commands the 
executive powers to execute the act. Since will is the executive power 
in this case, then intellect is commanding will to will, specifically to 
love and desire spiritual goods. Moreover, Augustine states that the 
command would not be given unless the will was ready, unless it 
already willed. In Aquinas’s terms, we can liken this stage of will to the 
stage of choice. Intellect has settled on what is to be done, namely to 
will these spiritual goods, and will has elected that it should be done 
(choice), and thus Augustine is poised or prepared to act. Will has 
chosen and intellect has commanded that will act; all that remains is 
to act, and yet Augustine fails to go through with it. 
Augustine proceeds to explain that the act of will is not 
performed, because “the strength of the command lies in the strength 
of the will, and the degree to which the command is not performed lies 
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in the degree to which the will is not engaged.”64 In Aquinas’s terms, 
we can understand will’s failure by interpreting will’s lack of 
engagement as a failure in use at the level of will. For Augustine, will 
does will the act of loving and desiring spiritual goods qua choice (i.e., 
in the first relation of will to the end-through-means). Moreover, 
intellect commands that this act of will be done; intellect is not 
divided, presenting mixed messages to will about what to will. Yet will 
does not obey intellect’s command and execute the act, because will 
fails to apply the executive power, which in this case is will itself, to its 
operation, namely the loving and desiring of spiritual goods. In 
Aquinas’s terms, this is a failure of use, but one that ultimately rests 
with will and not intellect. 
For Aquinas, full engagement of will with respect to the end-
through-means comes when will relates to the end by actually 
triggering and sustaining the execution of the act so that the end 
might be realized (i.e., in the second relation of will to the end-
through-means). In Augustine’s terms, the command is insufficient 
unless it is followed and will obeys the command by being fully 
engaged so that it executes the act. A description of Augustine’s 
experience in terms of a failure in use captures where the breakdown 
occurs. Even though his will has chosen, thereby poising Augustine to 
act, and even though intellect has commanded the act, he continues to 
fall short of his goal to live a morally upright life, because his will fails 
to use its choices by failing to trigger and sustain the act of desiring 
and loving spiritual goods. Aquinas’s distinction between choice and 
use helps explain how to make sense of Augustine’s claim that he both 
wills and does not will conversion. Augustine’s will does not yet form a 
wholehearted volition because it is engaged qua choice but not qua 
use. 
An analogy between the relevant stages in human action and a 
horse race illuminates my application of Aquinas’s conceptual 
distinction between choice and use to Augustine’s monstrosity. 
Imagine the start of a horse race in which the jockeys and horses are 
in their starting gates poised to start the race and reach the finish line. 
We might liken this stage in the race to choice, where, by willing a 
particular means (i.e., the first relation of will to the end-through-
means), the agent becomes prepared to act. She is in the starting gate 
ready to execute the act and attain the end. Yet in order for the race 
to start, the starter must open the gates and ring the bell as a kind of 
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command to begin racing. We might liken this opening of the gate, 
which orders the start of the race, to intellect’s command to act. Yet 
even though the horses are prepared to race (choice), and even after 
the gate is opened (intellect’s command), the horses cannot begin to 
race and cannot, therefore, begin to go for the goal until their 
respective jockeys trigger them into motion through spur or whip. 
Moreover, once the horses are set into the motion of racing around the 
track, in order for them to continue this motion and succeed at 
reaching the finish line, the jockeys must sustain the horses’ running 
by continuing to spur and whip them. If a jockey were to stop doing 
these things right after the horse left the starting gate, or sometime 
during the middle of the race, the horse will slow down or stop 
altogether, and will likely fail to reach the finish line. 
Just as jockeys must trigger their horses into motion and then 
continue to guide and encourage their horses until the finish line is 
reached, in order for Augustine to achieve the moral change he now so 
ardently desires, will must use its choices by triggering and sustaining 
itself to love spiritual goods. In choice, Augustine is poised in a kind of 
anticipatory stance to pursue the end, and intellect commands the act: 
will is in the starting gate and intellect has opened them up. Yet unless 
will uses the executive power, which in this case is will itself, by 
propelling it into motion and then sustaining its motion throughout the 
execution of the act, then Augustine will not realize the desired end. 
We can explain Augustine’s monstrosity, and our own experiences of 
this kind of weakness of will, as a failure in use at the level of will. 
If we concede that Augustine’s experience is a bona fide case of 
weakness of will (as opposed to recklessness), we can then use 
Aquinas’s conceptual distinction between choice and use to explain this 
kind of moral weakness. Applied in the alternative way I suggest, the 
distinction between choice and use helps explain the kind of moral 
weakness where an agent does not make an error in judgment, and 
really does seem to make bona fide choices about how to act, and yet 
fails to go through with it when the moment for action arises. Cases of 
moral weakness in which intellect is fully engaged, and in which an 
agent makes a genuine choice to act but then fails in the moment to 
go through with it, are cases in which will is engaged qua choice but 
not qua use. Aquinas posits use because he recognizes the gap 
between being poised to go after an end, and pursuing and possessing 
that end. In use, will functions as a kind of bridge that links our 
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choices with our behavior. I turn now in the final section of the paper 
to bolster support for using Aquinas’s schema in this alternative way 
by linking his insights to recent developments in contemporary moral 
approaches. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Though choice is often thought of as a most distinctive and 
central feature of human agency, in my view, it is the use of one’s 
choices that is at the heart of human conduct. It is in use that we 
make our mark on the world and that our choices become real and 
relevant in a way that they are not when they remain mere choices 
without action. As Augustine’s experience indicates, there is a need for 
use in order to explain how human acts come together and how they 
can fail in cases of weakness of will. Use is central because it is the 
volitional component that translates our choices into behavior; it 
creates the bridge between our decisions and the causally efficacious 
impact we have on the world and for which we can be held 
responsible. 
Moral growth takes time and requires that we translate our 
decisions into behavior. In some cases people may have mere fleeting 
wishes to be morally good. They may recognize certain principles and 
ideals as good, and wish to have them, but not yet will to live up to 
them in a way that prompts serious reflection about what sorts of life 
choices they must make in order to do so. This lack of moral 
seriousness often results in, at best, hypocrisy, whereby people feign 
to be what they are not, or at worst, in a moral indifference expressed 
in the sentiment that “behaving morally is nice, but hard, and so I’m 
not really interested.” Yet, like Augustine, many people take morality 
seriously. They form intentions to live up to their moral principles and 
go so far as to make choices about precisely how to do so. However, 
when the decisions and the requisite behavior are novel, requiring that 
we break old habits or extend moral commitments in new directions, 
the translation of those choices into action is difficult, and we are likely 
to fail a lot before we begin to get it right. The attempt to use our 
choices by translating our choices into behavior is where the real 
struggle often lies, and where moral weakness is often revealed.65 
Recent developments in the psychology of human action reveal, 
however, that this kind of moral weakness, these failures in use at the 
level of will, may be a normal part of human experience. Psychologist 
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Chris Argyris of the Harvard Business school has studied this 
phenomenon in professional organizations, noting that people often 
espouse views about how to treat others in a professional setting, 
decide they will do so upon entering a meeting or professional 
interaction, but then fail to act accordingly.66 According to Argyris, 
people have mental maps with regard to how to act in certain 
situations that are constructed in large part based on what they learn 
in early childhood and from cultural mores regarding appropriate moral 
and social behavior. Argyris became famous for arguing that the 
apparent split between principle and practice really involves two 
competing theories of action, what he calls the espoused theory and 
the theory-in-use. An espoused theory, as the name suggests, refers 
to principles of action an agent claims to endorse. Theories-in-use 
refers to those underlying principles of action that are often reflected 
in an agent’s behavior. A theory-in-use is the cumulative effect of 
those mental maps we develop early on. Because they often have the 
weight of habit and familiarity, theories-is-use tend to shape an 
agent’s behavior more so than whatever ideals or principles she may 
espouse, however sincerely she may hold them. That is, even once 
people have chosen a particular course of action based on their 
espoused theories, there are internal psychological constraints that 
can, and often do, inhibit translating those choices into behavior. 
However, when made aware of the gap, and with a fair amount of 
reflection and work, people can overcome the split and create new 
mental maps to direct their behavior in ways more consistent with 
their ideals. 
In answer, then, to Augustine’s initial question with which we 
began, “What causes this monstrosity and why does this happen?” The 
monstrosity of moral weakness may well be just a normal part of how 
the human psyche operates. Perhaps the real monstrosity lies not in 
the experience of moral weakness itself but rather in failing to take 
seriously the moral enterprise and allowing oneself to think that 
because living up to our moral ideals is difficult, then morality is only 
the purview of saints and heroes. Learning to use our choices requires 
serious self-reflection and continual effort on the part of the agent to 
“try and try again,” even in the face of repeated failure. Part of what is 
so compelling and inspiring about Augustine’s account of his own 
struggles is his sincerity in this moral enterprise as he challenges 
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himself to continue to strive for moral growth, to use his choices, 
despite the frustration of repeated failure. 
My analysis of Augustine’s monstrosity departs from Aquinas’s 
own views of the nature of will. Unlike Aquinas, I contend that 
weakness of will so described (i.e., as a failure of will, not intellect) is 
possible, and have argued that Augustine’s experience provides a real 
life example, indeed a paradigm case of weakness. Nonetheless, when 
applied in the alternative way I suggest, Aquinas’s fine-grained 
conceptual distinctions between the various operations of intellect and 
will required for a complete human action are extremely useful in 
explaining this kind of moral weakness. They enable us to make sense 
of Augustine’s claim that even though intellect is fully engaged, will is 
only partially engaged, both willing and not willing the desired end. 
Moreover, Aquinas’s notion of use is also useful in more contemporary 
discussions of the very common experience of struggles for moral 
growth, in which people make genuine choices about how to lead their 
lives and yet so often fail to translate those choices into behavior.67 
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